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The Law Professor as Schizophrenic 
Suzanna Sherry 
DEVINS SAYS that we don't put 
political science into our case­
and Gerald Rosenberg levels the 
same charge at our scholarship. And so it has 
fallen to me to defend the ranks of law profes­
sors from these scurrilous accusations. Unfor­
tunately, I can't do it: Rosenberg, at least, is 
largely right. 
Rosenberg's delightful little polemic has 
accurately diagnosed the problem. Law profes­
sors as a group are too arrogant, too disdainful 
of empirical information in favor of grand 
abstractions, and appallingly willing to write 
in disciplines of which they are woefully igno­
rant. There are many exceptions, of course: 
with or without additional degrees, some law 
professors are competent - even excellent -
historians, political scientists, economists, 
sociologists, and the like. But too many of us 
adopt the "law professor as astrophysicist" 
model: we think we can master any field in the 
time it takes to research and write an article.1 
It doesn't help, as Rosenberg points out, that 
we rarely learn from our students and that we 
allow them. complete authority qver scholarly 
publications. 
But what is the solution? Rosenberg seems 
to despair of finding one, but I think he might 
be too pessimistic. Not all law professors are -
or can ever become - competent in other dis­
ciplines, but many can and do. And I 'm sure 
that not all political scientists rank at the top 
of their fields either. (See, I can do mathemat­
ics, too!) Laments like Rosenbergs, and the 
examples provided by such legal scholars as 
Mark Tushnet, Barry Friedman, Dan Farber, 
and others who actually read broadly, will con­
tinue to improve the intellectual quality of 
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legal scholarship. 2 Moreover, collaborative 
efforts between law professors and members 
of other disciplines seem to be on the rise. 
Patience is a virtue: after all, only relatively 
recently have law schools begun to think of 
themselves as academic institutions rather 
than as mere training schools. 
Which leads me to Neal Devins' sugges­
tions. He, too, offers a solution of sorts to the 
problem Rosenberg identifies. Devins wants 
to put the political science into the casebooks, 
where neither students nor professors can 
ignore it. I will leave aside the question 
whether casebooks are the best way to 
broaden the horizons of law professors. And 
although Devins has certainly made some 
intriguing suggestions for an ideal constitu­
tional law curriculum, I have some difficulty in 
understanding why he thh1ks law students need 
that curriculum. 
Wea all like to supplement our constitu­
tional courses with interesting and relevant 
materials. For example, in addition to the 
political context of constitutional decision­
making, shouldn't we teach our students about 
the historical context of the Constitution and 
its interpretation:13 And wouldn't comparative 
constitutional law add tremendous value to 
current constitutional courses:14 How about a 
game theoretic analysis of Supreme Court vot­
ing behavior:15 Or examining the social context 
and implications of constitutional doctrine: 
looking, for example, at the interactions 
between the ebb and flow of abortion doctrine 
and abortion rates, unwed motherhood, 
children living in poverty? 
The problem is that we don't have time for 
everything that would be interesting and use­
ful. So the question is whether the sorts of 
materials that Devins suggests are more 
important than what is currently in the case­
books. And I just can't see how the average law 
student would be better off reading fewer 
Supreme Court cases and more material on 
legislative and executive decisions. 
Maybe William and Mary students regu­
larly go off to become lobbyists, and therefore 
need to be taught how to "advance their inter­
ests in both LJudicial and non-judicial] sec­
tors."6 Most of my students don't, so focusing 
on basic skills like reading cases and interpret­
ing and using precedent is more important for 
them. And even lobbying is easier if you can 
understand and argue the relevant cases: when 
several law professors testified before Con­
gress that the federal anti-flag burning statute 
would be constitutional, they had to make 
some creative (some might say fanciful) argu­
ments to distinguish Texas v. Johnson. 
In short, Devins overlooks the possibility of 
using the constitutional law course as simply 
another vehicle for instructing students in the 
2 It's always nice to name your friends in a law review article, which is why I picked these three out of 
the many possible examples. Apologies to all those whose names would have been equally 
appropriate. 
3 Shameless plug: For those who truly want to s1,1pplement a constitutional course with historical 
material on the drafting and ratification of the I789 Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the 
Reconstruction Amendments, there is a handy paperback available. See Daniel A. Farber & 
Suzanna Sherry, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CoNSTITUTION (West I990 ). 
4 See Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Foundation Press 
I999)· 
5 Another shameless plug: See Paul H. Edelman & Suzanna Sherry, All or Nothing: Explaining the Size of 
Supreme Court Majorities, _ N. CAR. L. REv. _(forthcoming 2000); Paul H. Edelman & Jim 
Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 63 
(1996). 
6 Neal Devins, How Constitutional Law Casebooks Perpetuate the My th of Judicial Supremacy, 3 GREEN BAG 
20 259, 261 (2000). 
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common law method, textual interpretation, 
reasoning by analogy, critical thinking, and all 
the various modes of legal argument. My 
experience is that law students need all the 
practice they can get in these areas, and that 
many upper class courses already give such 
skills short shrift in favor of loading up the 
students with technical knowledge of the par­
ticular subject matter. The constitutional law 
course is ideal as a counterweight, since the 
subject matter is not highly technical and most 
students won't need to know the details of the 
doctrines anyway. 
But besides cutting into time more usefully 
used on other skills, I am afraid that imple­
menting Devins' suggestions would have even 
more pernicious effects. I taught a traditional 
case-centered constitutional law course to 
first-year students for more thai;i 15 years. I 
have recently begun teaching civil procedure 
instead. And the differences in students' reac­
tions to the two courses persuades me that fol­
lowing Devins' program would exacerbate all 
of the problems of teaching constitutional law. 
Students come in believing that constitu· 
tional law is nothing but politics, and that 
they're as good at political argument as the 
next person - or the next Justice. Thus, they 
often view even the most basic instruction 
from the teacher as 'Just Professor Xs political 
bias showing again." Let me stress that I am 
not referring to controversial questions on 
methods of interpretation or validity of 
results, but only the basic skills of legal analy­
sis and argument. Does any constitutional law 
teacher think that Roe v. Wade is well-written 
or well-reasoned, even if it reaches the right 
result? Some of my students have insisted that 
it is, and that only political considerations 
would lead one to criticize the opinion. Does 
any constitutional law teacher deny that Mar­
bury contained quite a bit of dicta or that 
Brown v. Board of Education and its progeny 
ducked some important questions? Many of 
my students have tried to deny both, and to 
attribute any disagreement on that score to 
political viewpoints. 
The problem is that at least some of consti­
tutional law is similar to the rest of law in that 
it depends on an ability to read (and manipu­
late) precedent, to interpret (and misinter­
pret) text, and to make what we have 
traditionally called legal arguments. The fact 
that constitutional law is already at the politi­
cal end of the traditional continuum makes it 
difficult for students to understand that the 
constitutional law course is not just a free-for­
all debate about the wisdom of particular poli­
cies. But because they think its all politics, 
they bristle at any attempt to channel or criti­
cize their arguments. Again, I'm not talking 
about policy or controversial political deci­
sions: I'm talking about basic legal skills. I 
have had students in constit:lli:ional law tell me 
that my "interpretation" of the Courts actual 
holding in a particular case was incorrect, 
insist that strict scrutiny would be applied -
under existing equal protection precedent - to 
a hypothetical that explicitly included no 
intent to discriminate, or suggest that such 
terms as "privileges or immunities," ·aue pro­
cess of law;" and "equal protection of the laws" 
are not in the least ambiguous or open-tex­
tured, but instead have fixed meanings that 
can be linguistically (not historically) resolved. 
And they presume that if I disagree, I am just 
viewing the cases through a political lens dif­
ferent from their own. 
In civil procedure, by contrast, the students 
are willing - even eager - for any help a pro­
fessor can give them in learning basic legal 
'skills and deciphering cases, because they don't 
view the decisions as political or themselves as 
experts. And its not the content, its the atti­
tude. For example, when a student recently 
tried to make the argument that because the 
minimal scrutiny test is so weak, a constitu­
tional challenge subject to minimal scrutiny 
should be dismissed under 12(b )( 6), he hap­
pily accepted my contention that the more 
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appropriate judicial response might be to 
grant summary judgment. Even more tellingly, 
the students routinely actually try to apply the 
Courts test(s) for the constitutional reach of 
personal jurisdiction - a typically slippery 
constitutional doctrine if there ever was one -
rather than resorting to the political argu­
ments they usually made in discussions of due 
process in the constitutional law course. 
Devins' substitution of other materials for 
court cases in constitutional law simply 
increases these differences between the two 
courses, taking even more of the "law" out of 
constitutional law. Such a curriculum would 
only reinforce the students' unwillingness to 
view constitutional law as law. 
To the extent that we keep the constitu­
tional course court-centered, we can empha­
size its similarity to other subjects and 
therefore steer the students toward typical 
legal analysis. While I 'm not advocating teach­
ing the students that constitutional decisions 
are never political, I think focusing on the 
political context of constitutional decision­
making would simply strengthen the students' 
pre-existing belief that constitutional deci­
sions are always and onry political. And then 
large numbers of them can write off the course 
as just a political science seminar· that will 
never be important to them as lawyers. 
It should be apparent, then, that I also dis­
agree with Rosenberg's criticism that there is a 
disconnect between what law; schools teach 
and what lawyers do. The counseling, negoti­
ating, bargaining, and mediating that Rosen­
berg suggests are the largest part of a lawyer's 
job all take place against background assump­
tions about the state of the law and its poten­
tial application or alteration. The skills we 
teach in traditional Socratic classes - the abil­
ity to assimilate abstract information in 
advance and then to respond quickly and artic­
ulately to unexpected questions or statements 
or to additional information - are also vital to 
the tasks Rosenberg identifies. 
Maybe I'm just a traditionalist. But if we 
make any claim at all to be teaching students 
something that they do not learn as under­
graduates and will need as lawyers, it ought to 
be the core methods of legal analysis - what is 
sometimes disparagingly called "thinking like a 
lawyer." I can think of no better way to under· 
mine this goal than by reinforcing the stu· 
dents' belief that constitutional law is just 
politics by another name. 
The reader may wonder, then, why I think 
Rosenberg is right to insist that law professors 
· should integrate more non-legal materials into 
their scholarship but that Devins is wrong to 
extend that broadening tendency into teach· 
ing. The answer turns on the fundamental 
paradox of law teaching: unlike academics in 
virtually every other discipline, our students 
are not going to follow in our footsteps. We 
are academics; they are going to be lawyers. 
(Theres also another difference between law 
and every other academic discipline: law is the 
only field in which the students edit the jour· 
nals and the professors grade the exams - now 
what does that suggest about the competence 
of law professors?) 
In general, the attitudes and skills that we 
are trying to teach our students do not always 
overlap with the demands of scholarship. Let 
me take one of my own passions as an example: 
What fascinates me most about current Elev· 
enth Amendment jurisprudence is the wrong 
turns the Supreme Court has been taking ever 
since Hans v. Louisiana. There is a vast scholarly 
literature on the historical and political context 
of Article Ill, the Eleventh Amendment, and 
the subsequent cases. To my mind, that litera· 
ture raises serious questi6ns about current 
doctrine. My students are minimally exposed 
to these questions through reading the dissent· 
ing opinions in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Flor· 
ida and Alden v. Maine. But except for the 
handful who might go on to become law pro· 
fessors, they will probably never have to care 
whether Hans (or Seminole Tribe or Alden) was 
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rightly or wrongly decided. They simply need 
to be able to understand and apply the cases, 
and to be able to argue creatively for limits and 
extensions. Even the Supreme Court is 
unlikely to be receptive to a brief that points 
out that Hans was a consequence of the judicial 
abandonment of Reconstruction - and a fed­
eral district court will consider such an argu­
ment truly bizarre. So while the scholars 
exploring these questions should continue to 
consult as many non-legal sources as possible, 
there is no justification for a thorough treat­
ment of such sources in the dassroom.7 
It is thus unsurprising, and indeed 
expected, that there is some divergence 
between scholarship and teaching materials. 
Obviously, some scholarly ideas should - and 
do - make their way into teaching materials. 
To give but a single example (from among 
many), John Hart Ely's ideas8 provide an 
accessible and insightful way for students to 
think about the Courts Equal Protection 
cases. Moreover, there is certainly value in 
helping our students become reflective about 
law, even if there is no immediate practical 
import. We are still academics and they are 
still students, so a partial continuation of their 
liberal arts education is warranted. But we 
must be careful not to allow our own intellec­
tual interests to overwhelm the students' legal 
education. This is a difficult balance to main­
tain, and Devins' suggestions would destroy it. 
Gerald Rosenberg may well be right that 
we law professors are more like practitioners 
than lik� academics. That attribute is detri­
mental tQ our scholarship, but it is vitally nec­
essary to our teaching. We must be careful to 
remember that we are teaching future lawyers, 
not future academics. At the same time, we 
should not let that educational mission cabin 
our scholarship or keep us from intellectual 
creativity. In other words, we all have to be two 
people at the same time. No wonder every­
body keeps picking on, us. /jB 
7 Perceptive readers - at least those who happen to teach Federal Jurisdiction - may notice that I do 
not always practice what I preach. The Eleventh Amendment chapter (for which I was largely 
responsible) of my co-authored casebook on Federal Jurisdiction probably contains far too extensive 
a discussion of the "diversity explanation" and its critics, and overly lengthy excerpts from dissenting 
opinions. But Professor Devins, I take it, would further expand that discussion. 
8 See John Hart Ely, DBMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
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